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A Separate Crime of Reckless Sex
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Abstract: This article attempts to make progress on both the problems of sexually transmitted
disease and acquaintance rape by proposing a new crime of reckless sexual conduct. A defendant would
be guilty of reckless sexual conduct if, in a first sexual encounter with another particular person, the
defendant had sexual intercourse without using a condom. Consent to unprotected intercourse would be an
affirmative defense, to be established by the defendant with a preponderance of the evidence. As an
empirical matter, first-encounter unprotected sex greatly increases the epidemiological force of sexually
transmitted disease and a substantial proportion of acquaintance rape occurs in unprotected first encounters.
The new law, by increasing condom use and the quality of communication in first sexual encounters, can
reduce the spread of sexually transmitted disease and decrease the incidence of acquaintance rape.
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Introduction
Imagine that we wake up one morning to learn that a 19-year-old woman has accused a married
multi-million dollar basketball star (“Star”) of raping her at a Colorado resort. Stories from Star’s side
circulate shortly thereafter claiming that the woman willingly entered Star’s room and began consensual
sexual contact, but that Star stopped short of intercourse, concerned that he wasn’t wearing a condom.1
The prosecution charges that Star kept going, indifferent to the protection that a condom would provide.2
If the case is prosecuted criminally as rape, the prosecution will have to prove much more than that
Star failed to stop. In Colorado, which is typical of many states, the prosecution will need to prove, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that Star used physical force, threat of physical force or some kind of intoxicant to
cause the victim to submit to intercourse.3 This is an extraordinarily difficult task. Rape can occur without
any signs of physical force and the kind of bruising that might indicate physical force can accompany purely
consensual endeavors. Without any other witnesses, all attempts to prove a threat of physical force or the
presence of an intoxicant taken under coercion will inevitably devolve into a he said/she said contest. In the
end, the jury will be asked whether it is plausible that a possibly star-struck 19-year old had sex with a
multi-million dollar basketball hero. The jury will likely answer yes - because it is plausible. It may not

1

For a parallel story, see Allison Samuels, Who is the Real Kobe, N EWSWEEK , July 28, 2003 at

48.
2

3

Id.
CRSA § 18-3-402 (2003).

3

even be likely, but it is probably plausible.4 If it was plausible that she consented, Star will be acquitted of
rape charges.
If acquitted, Star will return to playing basketball, considered guilty of nothing other than adultery.5
But even if factually innocent of rape, Star may well be responsible for exacerbating the epidemic risks of:
HIV, pelvic inflammatory disease, various forms of genital cancers, nervous system damage, infertility, high
blood pressure, thromboembolic disease, and something like post traumatic stress disorder.6 Currently,
unless the prosecution can prove rape, these risks are routinely inflicted without any criminal sanction.

4

Juries in cases involving sexual conduct seem to take the burden of proof very seriously. A juror

interviewed after a well-publicized sexual harassment trial of an army officer said “it’s not that we did not
believe the women. It’s that we had reasonable doubt.” Martha Raddatz, All Things Considered (NPR
radio broadcast, Mar 19, 1998).
5

Adultery is not a crime in most states and, with the exception of military prosecutions, is enforced

virtually no where. See Martin Siegel, For Better or For Worse: Adultery, Crime and the Constitution,
30 J. FAM . L. 54, 54-57 n. 5 (1991/1992).
6 If Star did not know whether the 19 year old was infected with an STD, his choice to engage in
unprotected sex increased the chance that both he and any other individuals with whom he would
subsequently engage sexually (including his wife) would become infected. Indeed, the 19-year-old’s
accusation – even if false – may have reduced the risk that Star would spread a disease contracted in
Colorado. The accusation may have prevented Star from engaging in unprotected sex subsequently with his
wife (before being tested for STDs).

4

This article tries to fill that void in the criminal law by proposing a new crime of reckless sexual
conduct, imposed for needlessly putting a sexual partner at such risk. The proposal is simple: A person
would be guilty of reckless sexual conduct and subject to imprisonment of up to 6 months, if, in a first sexual
encounter with another specific person, he or she had sexual intercourse without using a condom. Consent
to unprotected intercourse would be an affirmative defense, to be established by the defendant with a
preponderance of the evidence. The prosecution would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this
was the first time that the defendant had sexual intercourse with the accuser and that no condom was used.
Because the concept of “first encounter sex” is crucial to our analysis, let us pause to clearly define
it. The term “first encounter sex” refers to the first time that two particular people have sex. It is
distinguished from “subsequent encounter sex,” which refers to any subsequent sex between the two people.
The term is not limited to the first time that an individual has sex. An individual who has a total of N sexual
partners over the course of her life therefore engages in N acts of first encounter sex.
Unprotected first encounter sex plays a crucial in exacerbating the prevalence of both STDs and
acquaintance rape. While an increasing majority of people report and aspire to using condoms during casual
7

sex, the unprotected residual of first encounter sex may have a dramatic effect on the spread of infection.

7

“Casual sex” has a number of different definitions. Some researches define casual sex as a “one-

night-stand.” Others define it as intercourse on the first meeting. T. Edgar & M.A. Fitzpatrick,
Expectations for Sexual Interaction, 4 HEALTH COMM. 239 (1993). Still others make the prior or later
relationship between the two individuals irrelevant. J. A. Simpson & S.W. Gangestad, Individual
Differences in Sociosexuality 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 870 (1991).

5

Unprotected first-encounters are also correlated with coercion. The lions’ share of acquaintance rape (that
is, non-stranger, non-relative rape) occurs in unprotected first encounters. Men who rape in recklessness,
by not finding the time or compassion to discern a partner’s consent, rarely find time to use a condom.
Minimally regulating this small subset of sexuality can pay big dividends. Public policies designed at
increasing condom use will make progress with regard to both STD epidemics and acquaintance rape.
Increased condom use in first sexual encounters will dramatically reduce the effective number of “nodes” in
the network of potential infection for the simple reason that many sexual pairings do not have subsequent
sexual encounters. Increased condom use will likely also reduce the incidence of acquaintance rape. Giving
men a new incentive to wear a condom in first-time sexual encounters should discourage the tragic lack of
communication that often gives rise to the illusion of consent. The very act of stopping to put on a condom
should increase deliberation and communication. The more deliberation and communication, the lesser the
likelihood of acquaintance rape.
The crime of reckless sexual assault will also be a powerful prosecutorial tool for the thousands of
acquaintance rape cases that are simply not winnable under current law. It represents a way to partially
overcome the “he said/she said” dilemma. Reasonable doubts can remain whether an alleged acquaintance
rapist raped, but there is often no question that he engaged in unprotected, first-encounter sex.
The message of our proposal is not necessarily to forego one-night stands, but rather to use a
condom or communicate enough so that one can know one’s partner is consenting. The new crime of
reckless sex would not replace current rape laws and it would not immunize men who rape with condoms
from prosecution under existing law. It would also not impose a punishment nearly as severe as rape. But,
like DUI law, its very existence would send a clear message that society considers reckless sex both
6

physically and emotionally damaging.
Our discussion is divided into four parts. Part I explains the dangers, both physical and emotional, of
unprotected sex – and the particular dangers when the first sexual encounter between two people is
unprotected. Part II describes the current laws regulating first-time encounters and condom use. Part III
then describes how the proposed statute would work and puts foreword the affirmative case for its
enactment. Finally, Part IV responds to two potential constitutional objections to the statute – whether the
law’s affirmative defense would unconstitutionally force defendants to prove a necessary element of the
crime and whether the law would unconstitutionally burden the rights of privacy and freedom of association.

I.

Sex is Dangerous
Sex is dangerous both physically and emotionally. While sexuality can be a core attribute of human

expression, it can also be the occasion for infection and coercion. This section details the dangers of
disease and coerced sex and argues that a small subset of sexual activity – unprotected first sexual
encounters between two people -- represents an unappreciated policy lever for addressing both STDs and
acquaintance rape.

A. Physical Dangers of Unprotected Sex
The exact number of people carrying STDs is impossible to determine because many STDs have no
symptoms, but one scholar has concluded that the number of undiagnosed cases of STDs probably exceeds
the number of diagnosed cases,8 and 15 million new cases are diagnosed each year.9 One in six men aged

8

J. Dennis Fortenberry, Unveiling the Hidden Epidemic of Sexually Transmitted Diseases 287

7

15-49 have genital herpes.10 Five million new cases of genital warts are diagnosed each year11 and four
million new teenagers acquire an STD12 each year. Some estimate that twenty-five percent of sexually active
teenagers carry an STD. 13 A British study concluded that half of all women are likely to become infected
with an STD during their first sexual encounter.14 Whether symptomatic or not, whether diagnosed or not, all
carriers of STDs can spread disease unless they use condoms during intercourse. Virtually all STDs can be
prevented by effective condom use.15
There are six major sexually transmitted diseases in the United States, three are bacterial,
chlamydia, gonorrhea, and syphilis and three are viral, HSV (genital herpes), HPV (genital warts) and HIV

J. AM . MED . ASSOC. 768, 768-69 (2002).
9

MEG MEEKER, EPIDEMIC: HOW SEX IS KILLING OUR KIDS 11 (2002).

10

THE ALAN GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, IN THEIR OWN RIGHT: ADDRESSING THE SEXUAL AND

REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH NEEDS OF AMERICAN MEN 53 (2002).
11

12

Id.
THE ALAN GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, FAMILY PLANNING CLINICS AND STD SERVICES

(2002).
13

Meeker, supra note 8, at 11.

14

Stuart Collins et. al., High Incidence of Cervical Human Papillomavirus Infection in Women

During Their First Sexual Relationship, 109 BRITISH J. OF OBST . & GYN. 96 (2002).
15

Guttmacher Institute, supra note 9, at 56 (consistent condom use is 99% effective in preventing

HIV transmission).

8

(which can lead to AIDS).16 Bacterial diseases are treatable with antibiotics, but if left untreated ca cause
sterility,17 destroy the nervous system18 and lead to spontaneous abortions, premature delivery and birth
defects.19

Viral diseases cannot be cured at all.

1. Gender Effects
The physical dangers of STDs are visited disproportionately on women. In any given episode of
unprotected heterosexual intercourse with an infected partner, a woman is significantly more likely than a
man to get an STD.

In one single act of unprotected sex, a teenage girl has a one percent chance of

getting HIV, a thirty percent chance of getting HSV (genital herpes) and a fifty percent chance of getting
gonorrhea.20 Male to female transmission of HIV during vaginal intercourse is twenty percent more likely
than female to male transmission.21 A recent study found that the annual risk of genital herpes transmission

16

Id. at 52-53.

17

Chlamydia can cause sterility in men, infertility in women and lead to ectopic pregnancy and

chronic pelvic pain in women. Id. at 54.
18

Untreated syphilis destroys the nervous system. Id.

19

These pregnancy-related problems are often symptoms of gonorrhea. Id.

20

The Alan Guttmacher Institute, Teen Sex and Pregnancy, FACTS IN BRIEF (Sept. 1999),

http://www.agi-usa.org/pubs/fb_teen_sex.html.
21

KING K. HOLMES, P. F REDERICK SPARLING ET. AL., S EXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES 121

(3rd ed. 1998).

9

was nineteen percent from men to women but only five percent from women to men.22 Women’s increased
susceptibility to some STDs is likely due to the fact that infected semen remains inside the female body for
some time after intercourse, whereas the male is exposed to an infected female only during coitus.23
Moreover, it is worth noting that unwanted sex probably carries with it a greater risk of becoming infected
with an STD. This is true not only because of the lower probability of condom use during unwanted sex.

24

Unwanted sex also carries a greater risk of infection both because cervical mucus (which is not likely to be
produced in a nonconsensual encounter) acts as a barrier to transmission and because the absence of mucus
(not to mention potential force) is likely to lead to greater tearing and therefore greater chances for
infection.25
If infected, women are more likely than men to develop serious medical complications. AIDS
affects both sexes equally, but most other STDs do not. Ten to forty-five percent of women infected with
gonorrhea and ten to thirty percent of women infected with chlamydia develop pelvic inflammatory disease,
an upper genital tract infection.26 Men are not nearly as susceptible to this kind of infection.27 Of women
with pelvic inflammatory disease, one in five will become infertile; one in ten will have an ectopic pregnancy

22

23

24

Id.
Id. at 119, 121.
See infra at 5.

25

Holmes, Sparling et al., supra note 21, at 120.

26

Id. at 123.

27

Id. at 121.
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(in which the fetus implants outside the womb), which is the leading cause of first-trimester deaths among
American women in the United States.28 Certain kinds of genital warts are linked to the development of
genital cancers in both sexes, but the genital cancers that women get, cervical, vulvar, vaginal and anal, are
fairly common, whereas penal cancer, the only cancer linked to genital warts in heterosexual men, is rare.29
Furthermore, women infected with an STD are particularly vulnerable to serious pregnancy
complications, including spontaneous abortions, stillbirths, premature rupture of membranes and preterm
delivery. The fetuses these women carry are susceptible to central nervous system damage, eye infections
(which can lead to blindness) and pneumonia (which can lead to chronic lung disease).30 Thus, unprotected
sex leaves women at greater risk for contracting an STD and if a woman contracts an STD she incurs a
substantial risk of physical injuries that men simply do not encounter.

2. Epidemiological Effects
Unprotected sex with an STD carrier is dangerous business. One’s likelihood of contracting or

28

Id. at 123.

29

Id. However, gay and bi-sexual men are also susceptible to heightened rates of anal cancer

caused by genital warts. See Public Health Seattle & King County, Anal Cancer Among the Gay and
Bisexual Men, (Jan. 12, 2004), available at www.metrokc.gov/health/glbt/analcancer.htm (“Statistics
show that the rate for anal cancer in gay and bisexual men (without HIV) is about the same as the rates of
cervical cancer in women before pap smears became routine.”).
30

Holmes, Sparling et. al., supra note 21, at 123.
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giving a STD is linked to one’s number of sexual partners,31 but a few individuals with two or more
simultaneous partners who engage in unprotected sex “can play a central role in spread[ing] infection.”32
First-time sexual encounters are particularly important to the epidemiological force of an STD. The
33

average person in the United States has sex with six or seven partners over the course of their lives, but
the number of sexual partners that people have varies greatly. It is immediately intuitive that an STD is more
likely to spread when the average person in a population has a larger number of sexual partners, but the
variance in number of sexual partners in a population is positively related to the expected replication rate of
an STD also. Epidemiologists have modeled the force of an epidemic’s “infectivity” in populations with
heterogeneous sexual frequency to equal:

 σ2
R0 = ρ0  1 +


µ

31

Id. at 28.

32

Id. at 32. Of those people infected with an STD, a higher proportion of women than men are

only “receivers,” that is, they acquired an STD only because of the risky behavior of their partner Id. at 59.
Unlike many of the gendered effects of STDs, see infra text accompanying notes 19-29, this medical
conclusion may stem more from social facts regarding sexual behavior than from physiology or biology.
Nonetheless, it suggests that not only are women more vulnerable to acquiring and suffering from STDs,
they are less culpable in transmitting them.
33

Tom W. Smith, Adult Sexual Behavior in 1989: Number of Partners, Frequency of Sex and

Risk of AIDS, 23 FAM . PLANNING PERSP. 102, 103 table 1 (1991).
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where ? 0 is the average number of infections produced by an infected person in an uninfected population,
34

s 2 is the variance of the number of contacts, and µ is the mean number of contacts in the population. R0
measures the “infector number” (sometimes referred to as “reproductive rate” or “threshold parameter”), the
average number of secondary infections produced by a single index case in a population of susceptible
35

persons. The disease rate is stable (or “endemic”) when the infector number (R0) equals one; epidemic
when greater than one; and eventually 0 (the disease will die out over time) when less than one.

36

From the foregoing equation, it is clear that (for a fixed average number of partners) the larger the
variance, the larger the epidemiological force of the disease. This means that populations with a larger
variance in the number of partners will produce self sustaining epidemics with less infectious STDs. The
intuition for the positive impact of variance is that populations with low means but high variances in the

34

ROY M. ANDERSON & ROBERT M. MAY, INFECTIOUS DISEASES OF HUMANS: DYNAMICS AND

CONTROL (1992).
35

James C. Thomas & Myra J. Tucker, The Development and Use of the Concept of a Sexually

Transmitted Disease Core, 176 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 134 (Supp. 1996).
36

This formula assumes a uniform probability that a sexual encounter between an infected and an

uninfected person will lead to the uninfected person becoming infected. Thus, the formula remains accurate
as long as every pair decides to use a condom with a particular probability. Although this degree of
complete uniformity is not likely, and there might be variations within subpopulations, there is little reason to
believe that different rates of condom usage make the model wholly inaccurate.

13

number of sexual partners are likely to exhibit large connected networks of sexual nodes. The few members
of the population with many sexual partners are likely to form connections with members of the population
who have few other sexual partners. Randomly infecting a node in a high variance network is therefore
37

likely to yield a large epidemic.

The importance of variance to the epidemiological force of infection matters because human
sexuality often exhibits extremely high variance in the number of sexual partners. Indeed, as an empirical
matter, the distribution of the number of sexual partners is highly skewed to the right. The great majority of
people have only one or zero sexual partners in the last year (and only a handful during the course of their
lives) but a few people report dozens or even hundreds of partners. The tremendous skew has, through
analogy to a variety of physical systems, led some people to suggest the possibility that human sexuality
38

might be an example of a “scale free” network with an infinite variance. If human sexuality is a scale-free

37

Robert M. May & Alun L. Lloyd, Infection Dynamics on Scale-free Networks, 64 P HYSICAL

REV. E 066112 (Nov. 2001).
38

A scale free network is one where the distribution of connectivity is extremely uneven. In

networks where the degree of connectivity follows a power law, the probability P(k) that a node in the
network connects with k other nodes is proportional to kV (where V is between 2 and 3). Albert-Laszlo
Barabasi & Albert Reka, Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks, 286 SCIENCE 509 (Oct. 15,
1999) available at http://www.nd.edu/~networks/Papers/science.pdf. Scale free distributions exhibit
infinite variance because the tails of the distribution are sufficiently fat that squaring the deviations from the
mean is exponentially greater than the decline in probability mass.

14

network, policies aimed at reducing the number of unprotected encounters are likely to be highly effective
means of reducing infection:
Another property of scale-free networks is that despite their high susceptibility they are very
sensitive to strategic removal of nodes. This turns out to be of importance for the prevention of the
spread of STIs because if only a few very active persons are removed (or change their
behavior), the network very soon falls apart in separated components, thus preventing the
39
emergence of epidemics.
Even if the distribution of sexual partners is not infinite, what is important for policy is that the extreme right
skew of the distribution makes the variance so large that the reproductive number for many STDs will
exceed the crucial threshold number of one – causing the size of the infection to increase over time – almost
regardless of the mean number of sexual partners or the degree of disease infectiousness.
The average sexual behavior of most populations is not sufficient to sustain either an epidemic or an
40

endemic STD infection. For example, if everyone had exactly 7 sexual partners during the course of his or
her lifetime (so that the variance in the number of partners was zero) most STDs would cease to exist.
Rather, “the driving factor of most STDs is clearly the tail of the distribution.”41 This minority of people

39

Fredrik Liljeros, Christofer R. Edling & Luis A. Nunes Amaral, Sexual networks: Implications

for the Transmission of Sexually Transmitted Infections, 5 MICROBES AND INFECTION 189 (Feb.
2003).
40

James Holland Jones and Mark S. Handcock, An assessment of preferential attachment as a

mechanism for human sexual network formation, PROC.: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1123 (2003).
41 H. Stigum, W. Falck, P. Magnus, The Core Group Revisited: The Effect of Partner Mixing and
Migration on the Spread of Gonorrhea, Chlamydia and HIV, 120 MATHEMATICAL BIOSCI.1 (1994).
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who have many sexual partners – sometimes referred to as “the core” -- crucially determines the force of
the infection.

42

The tremendous skew underscores the importance of first-time sexual encounters to the
reproduction of STD infections. While a great deal still needs to be learned about casual sex, it is almost
certainly true that the further one goes into the right hand tail of the numerosity distribution, the larger the
probability of one-night stands. An individual who has ten or twenty sexual partners in a year is more likely
to be having one night stands than a person who has only a single sexual partner in a year. Thus, while onenight stands may represent only a small proportion of all sexual intercourse, they represent a substantial
proportion of the force of the infection because they represent a substantial proportion of the nodes of
contact. Promoting condom use just on first-time encounters will have a dramatic effect on the rate of STD
infection because a substantial proportion of first-time encounters are not followed up by subsequent sexual
encounters – and this is particularly true of those few individuals who have a large number of partners. Put
differently, promoting condom use for one night stands can reduce the effective size of the right hand tail of
the distribution and it is this tail which is so crucial to reproductive force of the infections.
What proportion of sexual relationships are just one-night stands? Unfortunately, we don’t know
for sure. A national survey of one thousand Americans between the ages of 18 and 65 found that nine
percent of respondents reported having had at least 11 “one-night stands” (another twenty-six percent

42

Id.

16

43

reported having between 2 and 10).

A 1991 survey of Texas college students found that twenty-four
44

percent of those sampled reported having two or more one night stands in just the last year.

The

proportion of sexual relationships that are one night stands is important because reducing infections in onenight stands might represent a dramatic way to reduce the epidemiological power of STD infections. If it
turns out that the magnitude is thirty percent or higher, it one night stands could be a “but-for” cause of
most STD epidemics. If people used condoms in first sexual encounters we would dramatically disarm this
but-for cause.
The idea of intervening to promote condom use in casual sexual encounters has been the corner
stone behind Thailand’s recent one hundred percent condom use policy, pursuant to which the state has
45

provided free condoms in brothels. It is also the basis of the “ABC” approach -- abstinence, be faithful,
condom use – to AIDS prevention.

43

46

The “be faithful” component is often shorthand for a strategy of

Adam Marcus, One-night Stands Are Not That Rare, Survey Says, HEALTH SCOUT REP.

(2003) available at http://adutopia.subportal.com/health/Love_Sex_Relationships/Sex/110905.html.
44

K. G. Hursey et. al., Effects of AIDS Education on Knowledge, Attitudes, and Behavior.

Presentation: American Psychological Association, San Francisco, CA, (1991) available at
http://dataguru.org/love/sexstd/index.asp.
45

Nicholas Ford & Suporn Koetsawang, A Pragmatic Intervention to Promote Condom Use by

Female Sex Workers in Thailand, 77 Bull. World Health Org., 888 (1999).
46

John D. Shelton, Daniel T. Halperin, Vinand Nantulya, Malcolm Potts, Helene D. Gayle, King K.

Holmes, Partner Reduction is Crucial for Balanced "ABC" Approach to HIV Prevention, 328 BRIT.

17

47

partnership reduction which will reduce the right-hand tail of the distribution. Enhanced condom use in
casual or short-term sexual relationships can have the same effect without reducing the actual number of
partners. Because effective condom use largely eliminates the probability of infection for many types of
STDs, it is as if many of these one-time encounters did not exist. Changing behavior in just the first
encounter is accordingly the kind of target policy that might pay huge dividends in disintegrating the network
of infection.

B. Emotional Dangers of Nonconsensual Sex
The dangers of sex are not limited to disease. Sex is emotionally dangerous as well, because in
48

addition to their physical qualities, most sexual acts have enormous emotional content. Some scholars and
probably most people simply accept that there is emotional vulnerability in sex.49 Others, though, have tried
to minimize the emotional content of sex, either for pedagogical or policy reasons.50 There are advantages

MED. J. 891 (2004).
47

Id. at 891 (“Behavior change programs to prevent HIV have mainly promoted condom use or

abstinence, while partner reduction remains the neglected component of ABC.”).
48

The physical dangers of STDs bring their own emotional harm, but here we focus on the emotional

dangers of non-consensual sex.
49

OF LAW

STEVEN SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE

50

100, 117 (1999).
See RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992) (Posner seeks to have his readers see sex as a

rational act as understood pursuant to his “bio-economic theory”); Donald Dripps, Beyond Rape: An
18

to minimizing the emotional content of sex because if sex is not experienced or idealized as a deeply
emotional encounter, then one stands to lose less emotionally if the encounter does not go well. Forced,
coerced and simply unwanted sex would likely be less injurious if what was being forced, coerced and
taken was not seen or experienced as anything more than a physical act.
Critiques of the attempts to minimize the emotional content of sex suggest, however, that to take the
emotional content out of sex is to rob sex, and indeed humanity, of critical, self-constitutive meaning. As
Martha Nussbaum points out, at times, the excruciating toll that the emotional content of sexual desire takes
on peoples’ souls is a core literary tradition.51 This tradition teaches that risking emotional loss is necessary
if we are to ”expose [ourselves] to real joy.”52 Robin West suggests that when we think of our sexual
experiences as physical exchanges, experiences that do not necessarily involve one’s soul or one’s self “we
justifiably think of ourselves as being in some way deadened in the process.”53 “Ideally - and it may be an

Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM . L.
REV. 1780 (1992) (Dripps endorses a co-modified view of sex so that the crime of rape involves the theft
of that commodity); LINDA HIRSHMAN & JANE LARSON, HARD BARGAINS: THE POLITICS OF SEX (1998)
(Hirshman and Larson endorse a “bargaining approach to sexual regulation,” so that women who bargain in
sexual exchanges can be protected by laws that govern the marketplace and labor markets, instead of being
abandoned because of the law’s resistance to adjudicate emotional, personal issues.)
51

52

53

Martha Nussbaum, Only Grey Matter? , 59 U. CHI. L. REV 1689, 1724-26 (1992)
Id. at 1721
Robin West, Legitimating the Illegitimate, 93 COLUM L. REV. 1442, 1451 (1993).
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ideal worth holding on to - the ‘self’ is given with the giving of sex.”54 Sex is emotionally dangerous because
if one experiences it as an emotional act, one runs the risk of profound loss and rejection.
The emotional injury associated with sex is not limited to feelings of loss and rejection, however.
The harm done by nonconsensual sex is often described as closer to fatal. When one is raped, sex is taken,
not given. Rape in a world in which the emotional content of sex is minimized is a violent physical act.55
Rape in a world in which the emotional content of sex is idealized is a violent emotional act as well. One’s
ability to make oneself vulnerable in a manner that enables the self-constitutive, joyful giving of self in sex
becomes compromised after rape because sex has been experienced not only as physically violent, but as
devoid of compassion and self. It is an experience not of being rejected, but of being invaded and
overcome. That is why the literary tradition teaches us that rape is akin to spiritual murder.56 Once one has

54

Id.

55

Even if there is no struggle, Aunwanted sexual penetration involves unwanted force, and unwanted

force is violent “it is physically painful, sometimes resulting in internal tearing and leaving scars.” Id. at 1448.
56

Consider these two passages describing the feelings of women being raped:
The screams tried to break through her corneas out into the air, but the tough rubbery flesh
sent them vibrating back into her brain, first shaking lifeless the cells that nurtured her
memory. Then those went that constrained her powers of taste and smell. The last that
were screamed to death were those that supplied her with the ability to love - or hate.

GLORIA NAYLOR, THE WOMEN OF BREWSTER PLACE 170 (1982);
Charlotte felt Charlotte pass from her, she felt herself pass over into the noise . . . not a
person, not a girl, not even a body rigid with terror but noise, shouts, blows. . . . Pain or
spasms of pleasure, what did these matter? . . . Love, hate, pleasure, pain: they were
identical, descending into the firmest most stubborn layer of life, a vegetative neutrality.
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been raped, it becomes very difficult to make love.57

1. Reckless Disregard for Consent
The traumas associated with rape would not necessarily make sex dangerous if the line between sex
and rape were clear. If sex was sex and rape was rape, then sex would bring with it the emotional risk of
rejection, but not annihilation. The line between sex and rape is far from clear though, either for the
participants or for society at large.58 Men who acknowledge using force to get sex are often confused about
whether they actually raped because not all women resist in the same way; some men simply assume
consent if there is little resistance.59 Women are confused about their own role in expressing consent and
often feel responsible for any failure to communicate non-consent.60 One prominent researcher has

JOYCE CAROL OATES , “The Assault,” THE GODDESS AND OTHER WOMEN, 438, 460 (1974).
57

SUSAN BRISON, AFTERMATH 11 (2002) .

58

Consider the comments of both Richard Posner and Catharine MacKinnon. “[R]ape appears to

be primarily a substitute for consensual sexual intercourse. . . . “ Posner, supra note 52, at 384 (footnotes
omitted). “[T]he wrong of rape has proved so difficult to define became the unquestionable starting point
has been that rape is defined as distinct from intercourse, while for women it is difficult to distinguish the two
under conditions of male dominance.” CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE
STATE 174 (1989) (footnote omitted).
59

Eugene Kanin, Date Rape: Unofficial Criminals and Victims, 9 VICTIMOLOGY 95, 102 (1984)

60

Ronald Berger et al., Sexual Assault in a College Community, 19 SOC. FOCUS 1, 16 (1986).
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concluded that when rape happens early in a relationship, misperception is likely the primary cause.61 In
one of the most comprehensive studies on sexual practices in the United States, University of Chicago
researchers found that twenty-two percent of women reported having been forced to do something sexual,
while only three percent of men admitted to having used force.62 To quote the authors, “there seems to be
not just a gender gap, but a gender chasm in perceptions about when sex was forced.”63
What this means is that one person’s sex can be another person’s rape. That is why casual sex is
so emotionally dangerous; it might actually feel like rape to one of the participants. And, like most of the
physical dangers associated with sex, these emotional dangers are visited disproportionately upon women.
This is true both because women, on average, seem to view sex as more emotionally laden than do men,64
and because in those cases in which one person’s sex is another person’s rape, it is almost uniformly women
who experience the act as rape.65

61

R. Lance Shotland, A Theory of Courtship Rape: Part 2, 48 J. SOC. ISSUES 127, 129-130

(1992).
62

Michael et. al., supra note 40, at 223.

63

Id. At 227.

64

For a discussion, see Katharine K. Baker, Unwanted Supply, Unwanted Demand, 3 GREEN

BAG 103, 108-09 (1999) (reviewing STEPHEN SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX (1999)).
65

All of the previously referenced studies of acquaintance rape, see supra notes 58-64, involved

men raping women.
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2. Acquaintance Rape and Unprotected First Encounters
The miscommunication, or lack of communication, that characterizes many acquaintance rapes can
often be traced to recklessness. Recklessness can lead a man to complete the sexual act heedless of the
consequences. From this perspective, it should not be surprising that acquaintance rapists rarely use
condoms. Our interviews with both college rape counselors and with prosecutors underscore this basic
correlation. Seasoned rape crisis counselors tend to report that condoms were “very rarely used” during
66

acquaintance rape. Prosecutors report that few legal complaints of acquaintance rape concern protected
67

sex. A review of recent Westlaw cases found that less than one percent (52 out of 5898) of reported rape
68

decisions in 2003 mention the use of a condom. Whether acquaintances or strangers, rapists tend not to

66

Research assistants called dozens of rape crisis centers seeking information on the prevalence of

condom use in acquaintance rape. A majority of the respondents were reluctant because of confidentiality
concerns to share even the most general impressions about condom use. Others claimed that they had no
impressions. But of six rape crisis centers that did respond, two reported that condoms were “very rarely
used;” one reported that “hardly ever used;” one reported that condoms were used in sixteen to twenty-five
percent of the time but emphasized that this was merely a general impression; one reported “not often;” and
one reported “more often than not.” Only two of the respondents (one “very rarely used” and one “hardly
ever used”) were reported as being particularly confident in their assessment.
67

68

We confidentially contacted a handful of prosecutors.
The 5898 rape decisions were found in a Westlaw search of all state and federal cases containing

the word “rape!”. The 52 cases mentioning condom use were found by first searching the same data set for
23

69

use condoms.

Rapists also tend to rape in first time sexual encounters. In 2002, National Crime Victimization
Survey found that eighty-four percent of non-stranger, non-incest rapes were committed by
70

“friends/acquaintances” as opposed to “intimates.” Similarly, a national study of college rape victims found
that more than sixty percent of acquaintance rapes occurred in the context of “non-romantic” or “casual
71

dating” (as opposed to “steady” relationship). Nine percent of women age 15-24 say their very first sexual
experience was forced.72 Rape does occur in subsequent sexual encounters. Researchers sometimes refer
73

to this as “intimate partner rape” or “rape within sexually active couples,” but the data suggests that a

“rape! &condom” and then reading the individual cases to verify whether the case referenced the
defendant’s use of a condom.
69

Prosecutors did mention contexts in which condoms were more likely to be used– for example, in

cases where the rapist drugged the victim.
70

BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 199994 National Crime

Victimization Survey: Criminal Victimization, 2002 (August 2003).
71

Mary P. Koss, Thomas E. Dinero, Cynthia Serbel & Susan Cox, Stranger and Acquaintance

Rape: Are there Differences in the Victim’s Experiences?, 12 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 121 (1988).
72

Mary Rogers Gillmore et. al., Heterosexually Active Men’s Beliefs About Methods for

Preventing STDs, 35 PERS. SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 121 (2003).
73

Researchers distinguish between acquaintance rape that takes place between couples who have

“not yet engaged in sexual intercourse” and those who have. R. Lance Shotland, A Theory of the Causes
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majority of non-incest, acquaintance rapes are unprotected first sexual encounters.
***
Stepping back we can now see that there are deep parallels between the physical and emotional
harms of reckless sex, and unprotected first-encounter sex plays a crucial role in the incidence of both. To
be sure there are many instances of unprotected first-encounter sex that do not result in the spread of
infection or in non-consensual sex. (There are also many instances of driving while intoxicated that do not
result in an automobile accident.) Still, unprotected first encounter sex is dominantly responsible for the
74

right tail in the distribution of sexual contacts,

and it is this right tail that gives such power to STD

epidemics. Unprotected first encounter sex is also the occasion for a substantial proportion of acquaintance

of Courtship Rape: Part 2, 48 J. S OC. ISSUES 127. The distinction is important because intimate partner
rape tends be more violent than first-encounter acquaintance rape. Koss et. al., supra note 71. Moreover,
the problem of rapists’ misperception and miscommunication that loom large with regard to first-encounter
acquaintance rape are less like to be present with regard to intimate partner acquaintance rape. Our efforts
here are directed to the former category.
74

There are indications that public health organizations are beginning to stress the importance of

unprotected first-encounter sex in determining the power of STD epidemics. For example, cross country
U.N. databases are beginning to collect information such information, including “reported condom use with
a non-regular sex partner. OFFICE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, Health and Family Planning
Indicators:

A

Tool

for

Results

Frameworks,

Volume

I,

available

at

http://sara.aed.org/publications/cross_cutting/indicators/html/indicators1.htm.
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rapes. Moreover, both of these harms are visited disproportionately on women.

II.

The Current Legal Landscape
The last section showed that when combined two attributes of sex –sex that is a first encounter

between two particular people, and sex that is unprotected – are strongly linked to both STDs and
acquaintance rape. In light of these findings, we argue that the law should punish unprotected first time
sexual encounters. Although this proposal, as a whole, is novel, several of its constituent parts are not. In a
variety of different ways, the law already addresses the difference between first time and subsequent sexual
encounters, the meaning of protected versus unprotected sex, and the physical endangerment that sex can
create. The following sections explore each of these areas of the law.

A. First Encounters and Consent
At first blush, it might seem that the law does not explicitly distinguish between first and subsequent
sexual encounters in the regulation of sexual assault. After all, rape is rape. But it has always been more
difficult to prosecute rape in a case involving two people who have had a previous sexual relationship. The
most prominent historical example of this was the de jure immunity of spouses to certain forms of rape
prosecution. Many aspects of the marital immunity have been repealed, but remnants of it are still retained
75

in several states.

75

Michelle J. Anderson, Marital Immunity, Intimate Relationships, and Improper Inferences: A

New Law on Sexual Offenses by Intimates, 54 HASTINGS L. J. 1465, 1472 (2003) (“[T]wenty states
grant marital immunity for sex with a wife who is incapacitated or unconscious and cannot consent. Fifteen
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Indeed, the narrowing of the spousal immunity has been accompanied by a broadening of the scope
of relationships entitled to distinctive treatment. The expansion of covered relationships began in 1962
when the Model Penal Code extended its marital rape immunity to include any "persons living as man and
76

wife, regardless of the legal status of their relationship." The expressly disparate treatment of first- and
subsequent encounter sex can be found in today’s Model Penal Code which downgrades first-degree rape
77

to second degree if the victim "previously permitted [the assailant] sexual liberties." Professor Anderson
explains that several states followed suit, “Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, North Dakota, and West Virginia
enacted statutes that gave partial immunity to men who sexually assaulted women who had previously
permitted them sexual contact. If a man had previous consensual sex with a woman, he could not be
78

convicted of raping her.’

The disparate regulation of first- and subsequent encounter sex is also seen in the scope of rape
shield laws. In recent years, forty-eight states and the District of Columbia passed some form of rape shield
79

law. While these laws generally exclude evidence of a victim’s prior sexual history, nearly all jurisdictions,

states grant marital immunity for sexual offenses unless requirements such as prompt complaint, extra force,
separation, or divorce are met.).
76

77

78

79

MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(2) (2001).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1)(d) (2001).
Anderson, supra note 75, at 1521.
Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirements to Sexuality License: Sexual Consent and a

New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51 (2002).
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by statute or judicial decree, contain an exception: prior sexual behavior between the complainant and the
80

defendant himself will not be excluded.

The admission of evidence of prior sexual behavior, like the expanded immunity for subsequent
sexual encounters, has everything to do with presumptions about victim consent. As Professors Bryden and
Lengnick see it:
Although previous consensual sex is obviously not conclusive evidence of consent on the occasion
in question, nearly all commentators regard it as relevant, including thinkers as diverse as Susan
Brownmiller, Herbert Wechsler, Susan Estrich, and Menachim Amir. At least superficially, this sort
81
of evidence seems superior to evidence of intercourse with other men.
Outside of formal legal rules, these disparate presumptions about consent may also impact police,
prosecutor and jury behavior. Professor Anderson reports, “[p]olice frequently have been unresponsive or
hostile to women who report having been raped by their intimate partners. Some women have had to lie to
82

police to get them to respond to rapes by intimates.” Police are also more likely to find a complaint of
83

subsequent encounter rape to be unfounded. Moreover, “rape scholars report that, if the defendant and
84

his accuser had previously been lovers, juries are extremely reluctant to convict him.”
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81

Anderson, supra note 75, at 1524.
David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J. C RIM . L. &

CRIMINOLOGY 1283 (1997).
82
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Anderson, supra note 75, at 1525-26.
Anderson, supra note 75, at 1525 to 1526.
Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 81, at 1201.
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As a matter of raw statistics, the empiricism of the last section suggests that a much larger
85

proportion of first sexual encounters than subsequent sexual encounters are non-consensual.

Instead of

reflecting this difference through the scope of first degree rape, rape shields or police investigation policies,
our proposal creates a less punitive but broader crime that focuses in part on the serious problem of nonconsensual first encounter sex.

86

B. Condoms and Consent

Prior sexual activity with the defendant is just one of many factors the law considers when evaluating
rape. Another, even more controversial factor, is the presence of a condom. Most of the controversy of the
relevance of condoms started with a single, well-publicized incident in Travis County, Texas. On
September 17, 1992, Joel Rene Valdez, a 27-year-old house painter, entered into the victim’s house with a

85

Excluding incest, the statistics suggest there are more first-encounter acquaintance rapes than

subsequent encounter acquaintance rapes while there are far fewer acts of first-encounter sex than
subsequent encounter sex. See CALLIE M. RENNISON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 1998 (1999).
86

We reject the idea of immunizing intimates from the possibility of first-degree rape prosecution.

“Intimate or not, rape is rape.” Still, in the next section we will embrace the idea of immunizing intimates
from the separate crime of reckless sexual conduct. Indeed, by giving countenance to the heightened
probability of non-consensual sex with regard to first encounter sex, we might free criminal law to narrow
the immunities for subsequent encounter sex with regard to the more traditional crimes of sexual assault.
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knife, held the knife to her, and began assaulting her. The victim then requested that Valdez use a condom,
which he did. Later, the county prosecutor brought the evidence to a grand jury, which refused to indict.
While the grand jury proceedings were secret, one grand juror “later told an Austin television station that
some jurors believed that the woman's act of self-protection [by requesting a condom] might have implied
87

her consent.” Valdez’s defense lawyer was reported to say: “Consent is the only issue in a rape case, and
88

my client feels that the use of a condom implied consent.”

The idea that a grand jury would refuse to

indict because the victim of a stranger rape requested a condom sparked immediate public outrage.
Prosecutors brought the case before a new grand jury one week later and the new grand jury promptly
indicted Valdez, who was eventually sentenced to 40 years in prison.

87

89

Ross E. Milloy, Furor Over a Decision Not to Indict in a Rape Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25,

1992, at 18; see also Nobill in Rape Case Prompts Outrage; Suspect Wore a Condom at Woman's
Request, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 10, 1992, at 30.
88

89

Milloy, supra note 87.
Christy Hope, Rapist Gets 40 Years: Consent Defense in Condom Case Unsuccessful,

DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 15, 1993, at A33; see also Condom Plea Not Consent Court, HERALD
SUN, May 14, 1993 (saying that the conviction “[drew] cheers in the courtroom”). Prior to his conviction,
Valdez had argued that the request for a condom meant consent on both Donahue and in a tape-recorded
statement played during the trial. Roy Bragg, Woman Tells of AIDS Fear in Rape Case; Defendant
Claims Condoms She Gave Him Implied Consent, HOUSTON CHRON., May 12, 1993, at A1. However,
the Travis County district attorney David Counts obvserved:
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In response to the Texas case, California and Florida passed statutes regulating evidence of condom
90

use to prove the issue of consent. Although the wording of the statues is slightly different, both have been
91

interpreted narrowly, allowing condom use to come in as relevant to the issue of consent, but not allowing
the condom use to be the exclusive evidence of consent. Court decisions in other jurisdictions have also
eschewed any per se rule infering consent from either a victim’s request or defendant’s use of a condom,

92

[T[he jury in the Valdez case was so clearly offended by the condom defense that the defense
attorney did not mention it in closing arguments. [It] just doesn't fly. Jurors have common sense. This is not
the 1930s, where people think premarital sex hardly exists. The condom defense represents a backwoods
attitude.
Cindy Loose & Patrice Gaines, Condom Doesn't Mean Consent, Jury Says, WASH . POST , July
14, 1993, at C3.
90

See CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.7; see also FLA . STAT. § 794.022(5) (Rules of evidence for

Sexual Battery).
91

A California court held, “the jury . . . could consider the alleged victim’s request that a condom

be used – or in this case, the alleged victim’s purchase of condoms – but that it could not determine that she
had consented based solely on that evidence. People v. Mokres, 2003 WL 22475856 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003). A Florida court held, “[u]nder the statute, condom use is a factor which can be argued and
considered, but is not dispositive standing alone . . .” Strong v. State, 853 S.2d 1095 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2003).
92

See United States v. Robinson, 2003 WL 21786065 (N.M.Ct. Crim. App. 2003)
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but courts do tend to admit evidence of a request to use a condom as evidence bearing on the issue of
93

consent.

What is most important for this article, however, is that courts in limited circumstances have taken
94

the non-use of a condom as evidence of non-consent. For example, in State v. Ferguson, a Washington
court upheld a second-degree assault conviction of a defendant who intentionally exposed a woman to HIV.
The defendant argued that the woman’s consent to sex was a defense to the charge. The court found that
the woman in question “clearly consented to sex with a condom,” but found that consent to protected sex
95

with an HIV infected man could not be construed as consent to the unprotected sex that actually occurred.
96

Similarly, in Tyson v. State, an Indiana appellate court found evidence of a request for condom
use to be evidence that the woman was not consenting to unprotected sex. In this case, the victim, D.W.,
had said to the defendant, “Please put a condom on,” and, “I don’t need a baby.” On appeal, the defendant
argued that the jury should have been instructed that from this evidence the defendant might reasonably have
believed the victim had consented. In rejecting this argument, the court reasoned:
[The victim’s request], by itself, does not reasonably support the inference that D.W. consented to
sexual intercourse. However, D.W.'s request, along with Tyson's response, that he would prefer to
‘ejaculate [ ] on her stomach and leg,’ and Tyson’s after-intercourse statements—‘I told you I
wouldn’t come in you. Don’t you love me now?’—suggest only the inference that Tyson was aware
93

94

In re J.J., 2000 WL 210440 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000).
1999 WL 1004992 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999), aff’d in part and rev’d in part for other reasons,

15 P.3d 1271 (Wash. 2001).
95
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Ferguson, 15 P. 3d at 638 n. 32.
619 N.E.2d 276 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).
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97

that D.W. did not consent to unprotected sexual intercourse.

The victim’s request that her assailant use a condom did not constitute consent to sexual intercourse, but
rather (in consideration with other evidence) expressed non-consent to unprotected sexual intercourse that
actually occurred.
What should be clear is that the law already finds the use of condoms relevant, though not
necessarily determinative. Our statute elevates the legal importance of condom use both because we agree
with the courts that have already found that in particularized settings, non-condom use can be indicative of
non-consent,

98

and because of the separate epidemiological harm of unprotected sex.

C. Condoms and Reckless Physical Endangerment
Finally, before proceeding with our proposed statute, it is important to recognize that there is
currently some legal protection against reckless physical endangerment caused by sexual activity. Under the
Model Penal Code, a person who, knowing he was infected with an STD, had unprotected intercourse
without informing his partner of his condition might well be guilty of reckless physical endangerment.99 Some
states have enacted more particularized crimes of sexual endangerment. For example, California Health &
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Id. at 295 n.24.
See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 782 (W.D. Va. 1996),

rev'd, 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997), reh'g granted en banc and opinion vacated, 169 F.3d 820 (4th
Cir. 1999) (emphasizing that defendants did not use condoms). See also U.S. Appeals Court to Hear
Case Alleging Rape, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 1998, at B3.
99

MODEL PENAL CODE § 211 (2001).
33

Safety Code § 12029 provides:
“(a) Any person who exposes another to the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) by engaging in
unprotected sexual activity when the infected person knows at the time of the unprotected sex that
he or she is infected with HIV, has not disclosed his or her HIV-positive status, and acts with the
specific intent to infect the other person with HIV, is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment in
the state prison for three, five, or eight years.
The phrase “unprotected sexual activity” is expressly defined in the statute to mean “sexual activity without
100

the use of a condom.”

For people who know themselves to be infected, California’s statute imposes a

requirement to either disclose this information to their partners or use a condom. Missouri also has an HIV
prevention statute. It puts an unconditional duty of disclosure on infected persons who engage in sexual
101

activity regardless of whether or not they use condoms.

At first, Missouri’s unconditional duty seems attractive. Condoms sometimes break and uninfected
people might reasonably want to know that they are assuming the risks associated with breakage in
choosing to have sex with an infected person. But the Missouri statute may provide weaker incentives for

100

101

Id. § 12029(b)(2).
Prohibited Acts, Criminal Penalties, MO. ANN. STAT. § 191.677 (West 2002):
It shall be unlawful for any individual knowingly infected with HIV to . . . (2) Act in a
reckless manner by exposing another person to HIV without the knowledge and consent of
that person to be exposed to HIV, in one of the following manners: (a) Through contact
with blood, semen or vaginal secretions in the course of oral, anal or vaginal sexual
intercourse . . . . 4. The use of condoms is not a defense to a violation of paragraph (a) of
subdivision (2) of subsection 1 of this section.

See also Prostitution, Id. § 567.020 (West 2002) (“Prostitution is a class B misdemeanor unless
the person knew prior to performing the act of prostitution that he or she was infected with HIV, in which
case prostitution is a class B felony. The use of condoms is not a defense to this crime.”).
34

condom usage. In Missouri, an infected person who uses a condom still runs a risk that his or her partner
will claim that he or she was never told of the infection. Condom use won’t give an infected person any
legal advantage, so he may well not use one at all. This could lead to more infections. In the next section,
our proposal for a new crime of reckless sexual conduct will cleave closer to the California structure. Like
California’s statute, we will ask men to either use a condom or communicate more thoroughly with their
partners. And like California’s statute, condom use will provide a safe harbor from liability.
Currently, notwithstanding the California and Missouri statutes, the legal regulation of physical sexual
endangerment is incomplete and sporadic and the legal regulation of emotional sexual endangerment is
nonexistent. Cases alleging acts of physical endangerment based on unprotected sex have been brought and
won against people infected with HIV,102 but we have found only one (very old) case involving another
STD.103 There simply is no crime of reckless emotional endangerment. The failure of the law to address
emotional injuries associated with nonconsensual sex is a serious problem because, as mentioned, physical
injury is often not the gravamen of the harm in rape. If the essential harm of rape can be an emotional harm,
it would make sense to penalize its reckless infliction. Our proposed criminalization of reckless sexual

102

See, e.g., People v. Dembry, 91 P.3d 431 (Colo. App. 2003); Smallwood v. State, 680 A.2d

512 (Md.1996).
103

See Alan Stephens, Transmission or Risk of Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency

Virus (HIV) or Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) as Basis for Prosecution or Sentencing
in Criminal or Military Discipline Case, 13 A.L.R.5th 628 (1993). But see State v. Lankford, 29 Del.
(6 Boyce) 594, 102 A. 63 (Del. 1917) (assault and battery conviction for syphilis).
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conduct is tailored to do just that.
***
The last section showed that two dimensions of sexuality (first encounters and the lack of
protection) are statistically related to two societal harms (STDs and non-consent). These four permutations
are depicted in Figure 1.
Type of Societal Harm
STD

Non-Consent

Type of Sexuality

Marital/ Relationship
First Encounter
Exceptions
Reckless Infliction;

Valdez and

Public Health Codes

Its Progeny

Unprotected

The big picture is that the law sporadically and in very limited ways has already taken notice of three of
these four causal permutations -- the connection between first-encounter sex and consent, the connection
between unprotected sex and consent and the connection between unprotected sex and the spread of
104

STDs. The missing fourth category, which we can now see is conspicuous by its absence, is legal rules
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Guido Calabresi and Doug Melamed famously noticed a missing fourth category in a two-by-two

box. Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
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105

reflecting the causal connection between first-encounter sex and the spread of STDs.

In the next section

we will try to fill this gap by proposing a law that is sensitive in a more systematic way to both firstencounter and unprotected sex.

III.

The Affirmative Case for Criminalizing Reckless Sex
This section lays out our affirmative case for a new crime of reckless sexual conduct. To put it

simply, our goal is to promote condoms and communication for first-encounter sex. The first section
showed that promoting condom use for this small subset of human sexuality could make progress on the
problems of both sexually transmitted disease and acquaintance rape. Because condoms contain the viruses
and bacteria that can be transmitted during intercourse, they prevent the spread of virtually all STDs.
Because condom use requires deliberation and some patience, expanded condom use is also likely to
decrease those instances of intercourse in which one party fails to understand that the other party does not
wish to engage in intercourse. Though not as explicit in its communication-forcing as those rules that require

105

One might see the targeted regulation of bath houses as indirectly growing out of just this

concern. See RANDY SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON (1988) (discussing the controversy
surrounding the decision of the San Francisco Public Health Director to close public bath houses in 1980 to
help prevent the spread of AIDS and other STDs). See also Thomas Farley, Cruise Control, WASH.
MONTHLY,

(Feb.

2001)

http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/0211.farley.html.

37

verbal consent before initiating a move to a higher level of sexual intimacy,106 a default requirement of
condom use would likely have comparable information-forcing effects.107 The application of a condom
usually requires some interruption, a break from being carried away by the passion of the moment. It is that
interruption - that pause - which is likely to give both parties the opportunity to ascertain and correct the
kinds of misperception that can lead to rape. It gives all parties a required chance to re-assess the situation
and make sure the sexual intimacy should continue.
In what follows, we will show how, from three alternative analytic perspectives, the criminalization
of reckless sex is likely to increase condom use. From an individualistic, rational-actor perspective, the law
promotes condom use by raising the cost of unprotected sex. From a behaviorist perspective, the law
appropriately offsets and harnesses cognitive biases. And from a social norms perspective, the law
expresses a gentle nudge towards the use of condoms. The next sub-section presents a model statute of
our proposed law. We then attempt to show from rational actor, behavioral, and norm perspectives, that
the predictable consequences of criminalizing reckless sexual conduct will decrease the rate of both STDs
and acquaintance rape.
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Antioch College adopted such a policy in 1993. See Phil McCombs, Taking a Look at Love,

WASH. POST, Feb 16, 1996, at F5.
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For more on the value of information-forcing default rules, see Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner,

Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L. J. 87, 127130 (1989).
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A. A Model Statute
To be precise about the contours of our proposal, we present here a model statute and in the
margin briefly discuss a few drafting choices:

Reckless Sexual Conduct
(1). A person is guilty of reckless sexual conduct when the person intentionally engages in
unprotected sexual activity with another person who is not his or her spouse and these two
people had not on an occasion previous to the occasion of the crime engaged in sexual
activity.
(2). Affirmative Defense: Notwithstanding Subsection (1), it shall be an affirmative defense
to any action brought under this article that the person, with whom the defendant had
unprotected sex, expressly asked to engage in unprotected sexual activity or otherwise
gave unequivocal indications of affirmatively consenting to engage in sexual activity that is
108

specifically unprotected.

108

A woman’s past consent to unprotected sex should not be admissible to show that she likely

consented this time. We reach this result in accordance with both the policies underlying rape shield laws,
see e.g., FED. R. EVID. 412, and the policies underlying the much older and time-tested statutory and
common law prohibition against using prior acts to show action in conformity therewith. See e.g., F ED. R.
EVID. 404. But as with current rape shield laws there would likely be some exceptions. For example if
Kobe Bryant were prosecuted under our statute and if the prosecution intended to introduce evidence of
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(3). Definitions:
(a) “Sexual activity” means vaginal or anal penetration accomplished with a male or
109

female.

(b) “Unprotected sexual activity” means sexual activity without the use of a
condom.
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(c) “Occasion of the crime” includes the 12 hour period after the two people
111

engage in sexual activity for the first time.

vaginal injury to rebut a defense of consent, we would allow the defendant to introduce evidence of other
recent sexual partners as a potential cause of the injury.
109

While included as a definition of “sexual activity,” it is our intent that a prosecutor should prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant and the person with whom he or she had unprotected sex are
not married. The number of non-consensual first encounters among people who are married is ravishingly
small. The statute allows those few couples who do wait until their wedding night to forego a condom when
they do so. For those who find any marriage immunity to be an anathema, the words “who is not the
spouse of the perpetrator” could be deleted.
110

This definition is intended to include both the male and the female condom. It would immunize

defendants from prosecution even if they used a non-latex condom. An alternative version of the statute
might insert the word “latex” before “condom” in this definition.
111 The purpose of this section is to create a 12 hour window of scrutiny surrounding the first-sexual

encounter of a particular pair. Under this section, a defendant could not avoid liability by arguing that he
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(4) Sanctions:
(a) Sentence: The crime of reckless sexual conduct is punishable by imprisonment
in the state prison for three months, or a fine.
(b) Sexual Offender Status: The court shall not register a person as a sexual
offender because the person was found guilty of reckless sexual conduct.

B. A Rational Actor Analysis of the Statute
This statute, only 200 words long, would increase the use of condoms. Because condom use is a
safe-harbor, which makes first-encounter sex fall outside the scope of the statute – couples (and, as we will
argue below, particularly men) will have an incentive to use condoms to avoid the risks involved in having to
establish the affirmative defense (that the other person solicited or unequivocally indicated consent to
unprotected sex).

1. Decreases in Both Unprotected and Non-Consensual Sex
This general shift toward protected sex can be decomposed into different components. Figure 2
divides the landscape of sexuality into a stylized 2-by-2 box. One dimension distinguishes between sex that
is protected and unprotected; and the other dimension distinguishes between situations where a potential
defendant does and does not have sufficient indications of consent. Acquaintance rape would live in the

and the other person used a condom for their first sexual encounter and then later within the 12 hour period
engaged in unprotected sex. To fall outside the scope of section (1), all sexual activity within the first 12
hours of the first sexual activity (i.e. the first penetration) would need to be protected.
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“insufficient” consent row.
Protected

Unprotected
A
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Consent

C
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D

B

Figure 2: Three Predicted Shifts in Sexual Activity Caused By Criminalization

Some couples who would engage in unprotected consensual sex will shift to protected consensual sex.
Because the lack of protection will be consensual, they would not need to avoid the statute, but in order to
eliminate any strategic or spiteful use of the statue by a partner later, they will use protection. This shift is
depicted by arrow A. This movement is clear progress in the fight against STDs.
For other couples, the act of attempting to put on a condom will present an opportunity for the
parties (primarily women) to better express whether or not they truly consent. The result of this improved
communication will be to more explicitly inform men that sex (either protected or unprotected) is not
wanted. Studies suggest that at least some acquaintance rapists will not proceed if they truly learn the
woman is not consenting.
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This reduction in the amount of unprotected, unconsensual sex is depicted by

arrow B and would be clear progress in the fight against acquaintance rape. It would also reduce the rate of
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See supra, notes 58-65 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between many

acquaintance rapes and confusion regarding whether both parties had consented to the sexual intercourse).
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STD transmission.
At other times, the opportunity for clearer communication will lead to better evidence of genuine
consent. This condom-induced opportunity for communication is an opportunity for a conversation about
sex that may make both parties feel more in control of their decisions. Thus some of the unprotected,
ambiguously consensual sex in the shadow of the new crime will become protected, consensual sex. This
transformation is depicted by arrow C – and it represents progress in the fights against both STDs and
acquaintance rape.
Finally, some men who had been engaging in unprotected, nonconsensual sex will opportunistically
substitute toward protected, nonconsensual sex in order to fall inside the protection of the statute. This shift
is depicted by the arrow D. Movements along the insufficient consent row do not reduce the amount of
acquaintance rape. Nevertheless, the movement toward condom use still has a beneficial effect with regard
to the spread of STDs. Protected acquaintance rape, though still rape, produces lower risks of infection
(and pregnancy) than unprotected acquaintance rape. Protected acquaintance rape will not extinguish the
emotional harm of acquaintance rape, but it will reduce the physical harm. This is one of the reasons that
some rape victims ask that their assailant use a condom.
Thus, hyper-rational actors are likely to substitute toward condom use and/or conversation in the
shadow of a law that requires that a man either use a condom or stand ready to prove, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that his partner gave unequivocal indications of consent. On several margins, we would
expect to see a reduction in unprotected, first encounter sex (represented by arrows A, C and D). And on
one margin, we would expect to see not just a shift in the type of sexuality but an absolute reduction in the
level of sexuality (arrow B). Because of increased communication (and because nonconsensual sex is
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harder to accomplish with a condom) we expect that, in the shadow of the new law, some men who
113

previously would have engaged in acts of unprotected, non-consensual sex acts will stop having sex.

2. Decreases in Justice System Error
In addition to these four margins of benefit, the criminalization of reckless sexual conduct is likely to
decrease the overall “errors” in the criminal justice system. At present we are stuck in an equilibrium where
it is widely acknowledged that a large percentage of all acquaintance rapists go unpunished. After reviewing
data from several jurisdictions, the Senate Judiciary Committee concluded that ninty-eight percent of rape
114

victims "never see their attacker caught, tried and imprisoned."

The cause of this massive attrition is

multifold – including failures to report rapes to the authorities, failures to arrest and failures to convict. For
example, crime-victim survey data from the mid-1990s suggest that each year an estimated 500,000 women
115

are victims of some form of rape or sexual assault.

113

In 1994, only 102,096 rapes were reported to

It is also possible that some men and women who would have engaged in unprotected,

consensual sex acts will be so put off by the idea of using condoms that instead of switching to protected
consensual sex (arrow A), they will choose not to have sex. This result would have been depicted by an
arrow paralleling arrow B but starting in the upper right quadrant.
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116

authorities, and “ultimately there were only an estimated 36,610 arrests for forcible rape.”

And an arrest

does not assure conviction. One scholar found that "the likelihood of a rape complaint actually ending in
117

conviction is generally estimated at two – five percent.

The criminalization of reckless sexual conduct is likely to help ameliorate this problem. For many
instances of acquaintance rape, the new law creates the first practicable means of obtaining a conviction –
albeit for a crime with a modest sanction. A central goal of rape law reforms “has been to facilitate
118

prosecution of acquaintance rape cases,” but several studies suggest that the reforms have been largely
unsuccessful at increasing the rate of acquaintance rate conviction.
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At the end of the day, it is often
120

extremely difficult for prosecutors to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim did not consent.
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“Unlike stranger rapes, date rape trials are nothing but credibility contests. There is no fruit of
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In contrast, it will be fairly easy to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the sex was unprotected
and that it was the first sexual encounter. The presence of the defendant’s ejaculate found in a timely
examination can, along with other circumstantial evidence (concerning the exigencies of the intercourse),
provide powerful evidence that the sex was unprotected. Often the short duration of any acquaintance
between the defendant and the victim strongly indicates that the sex was a first encounter. To some it is
controversial whether William Kennedy Smith, Mike Tyson or Kobe Bryant engaged in non-consensual sex
– but it is fairly clear that each engaged in unprotected, first-encounter sex.

121

Therefore, the criminalization

of reckless sexual conduct is likely to reduce the problem of acquaintance rapists who go completely
unpunished.
The criminalization of reckless sex might also help deter statutory rape. Prosecutors are often very
reluctant to prosecute as rape a crime in which the victim willingly consented.122 Our statute could help in
two ways. First, its widespread enforcement should help elevate people’s awareness that teenage girls

the crime to be produced, no weapon to be traced and no mistaken identity. Everyone concedes that both
parties were there . . . and that intercourse did take place . . . Given how easily the sexual acts could be
consensual in these cases, it is very hard for the prosecution to remove all reasonable doubt that they were
not. Katharine K. Baker, Sex Rape and Shame, 79 B.U. L. REV. 663, 690 (1999).
121
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See Susan R. Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L. J. 1087 (1986).
See Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls Into Women: Re-evaluating Modern Statutory Rape

Law, 85 CRIM. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 23 (1994) (quoting a Los Angeles District Attorney as saying “it is
the policy of this office not to file criminal charges where there is consensual sex...”).
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engaging in unprotected first time sexual encounters are put at risk for grave, lifelong injuries. The more
people realize how dangerous sex can be, the more they may be willing to prosecute those who use their
age to extort it. Second, as with acquaintance rape, even if a prosecutor is not willing to prosecute someone
for statutory rape, he or she may be willing to prosecute or accept a plea for the lesser crime of reckless
sexual conduct. Again, those who now escape punishment altogether will at least be subject to some
criminal sanction.
There are, however, two types of justice errors: failing to punish the guilty, and punishing the
innocent (sometimes referred to as Type I and Type II errors respectively). By subjecting acquaintance
rapists and statutory rapists to at least some punishment, the crime of reckless sexual conduct is likely to
reduce Type I errors, but, by shifting the burden on the issue of consent from the prosecutor to the
defendant and making it easier for prosecutors to convict, it might increase Type II errors. Some
defendants who were in fact engaging in unprotected sex in which the other person had given “unequivocal
indications of consenting to unprotected sexual activity” may be unable to establish this fact by a
preponderance of the evidence. These men would be wrongfully convicted.
The size of this Type II error will crucially turn on the extent to which the defendants’ sexual
partners are willing to bring false claims of non-consensual, unprotected first-encounter sex. Current
research suggests that the propensity of women to make false reports of acquaintance rape is extremely
low. As Professor Lengnick summarizes, “The conventional wisdom now is that the proportion of false
reports is negligible, perhaps as low as two percent, a figure said to be comparable to that for most other
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major crimes.” Thus, while the new law will make it easier for prosecutors to convict, the problem of
Type II errors is likely to be limited by general reluctance of “victims” to bring false claims. Moreover,
given that the current equilibrium is so skewed toward Type I errors, the net number of judicial errors will
almost certainly decrease – even if we abide by the social tradeoff that it is better to let 20 guilty go free
rather than to convict even one who is innocent.
The risk of Type II errors is also one that potential defendants can easily avoid. As long as courts
are accurate in determining what is protected first-encounter sex, potential defendants can avoid prosecution
merely be choosing to use a condom. From an ex ante perspective, they hold the keys to their own jail
house. In contrast, potential victims of acquaintance rape under current law have no easy means of reducing
the risk of Type I error. Switching from a regime with very large and unavoidable Type I errors to one with
small but avoidable Type II errors is a trade-off that society should embrace.
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3. Could Criminalization Induce More Acquaintance Rape?
Figure 2 emphasized predictable shifts in the manner of pre-existing levels of sexuality – which in the
shadow of the new law became more protected and more consensual. It is also important to consider
whether the law would change not just the types of sex but the levels of sex. We already suggested one
such effect when we argued that the law would deter some unprotected, non-consensual sex. This was
represented by arrow B. We should pause to consider whether the law would cause some rapes to occur
that otherwise would not have taken place.
For example, might it be possible that potential perpetrators might, because of the new crime, feel
immunized to rape as long as they use a condom. If so, this might not just cause a shift from existing
unprotected rape (as depicted by arrow D) but also create an absolute increase in the total amount of nonconsensual sex – which is depicted by the additional arrow E in Figure 3, as instances of no sex become
instances of protected, non-consensual sex.

Protected

Unprotected
A

Sufficient

Consent

C
Insufficient

D
B
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E?

No Sex

Initially, we should be skeptical of this argument. While the use of a condom immunizes a firstencounter rapist from prosecution under the reckless sexual conduct statute, it does not immunize the rapist
from prosecution under any of the pre-existing sexual assault laws. Our proposal is to enact an additional,
complementary crime, not a substitute form of liability. Accordingly, we should not expect to see any
reduction in current levels of deterrence for acquaintance or stranger rape.
However, a more subtle form of the argument is that jurors deciding cases involving preexisting
claims of sexual assault will stop convicting if there is a condom and thus raise the bar for proving traditional
rape. The idea here is that jurors will come to think (notwithstanding the formal law) that non-condom use
is a prerequisite for finding non-consent – and thus as a practical matter will read into the rape statutes a de
facto requirement that the sex was unprotected. Potential rapists who had been deterred under the earlier
law will respond to this change by beginning to rape (or raping more) with condoms.
The possibility that our law might actually increase the amount of non-consensual sex is an important
challenge to our proposal, but for several reasons, we think it is highly unlikely that this additional crime will
reduce deterrence. First, the first grand jury in the Valdez case in Texas notwithstanding, jurors evaluating
stranger rape cases are not likely to be significantly effected by evidence of condom use. Mr. Valdez went
to jail for 40 years. It is increasingly implausible that jurors would acquit an alleged acquaintance rapist just
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because he wore a condom.
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Moreover, if legislators are worried about this, they can simply draft the

kind of statutes that California and Florida did, making clear that condom use is not proof of consent.
Second, we are skeptical that jurors would frame the elements of reckless sex as illuminating the elements of
rape. As emphasized below, these crimes have radically different sanctions (with regard to prison time,
stigma and potential labeling of a convict as a “sex offender”). Failing to wear a condom in first sexual
encounters is more likely to come to be seen as reckless (just as driving while intoxicated is reckless) rather
than as strong evidence that the victim failed to consent.
Third, we should be skeptical of the claim of reduced deterrence because as a statistical matter, it
would be hard to imagine a regime with a lower probability of punishments. Estimates are that less than two
percent of acquaintance rapists are criminally punished. This probability cannot fall below zero. It is
implausible that reductions in the probability of conviction would induce an influx of additional nonconsensual sex. Put more conservatively, it is unlikely that any increases in rape caused by reduced
probability of punishment (arrow E) would not be more than offset by the benefits of increased
communication and protection, and the benefits of reduced judicial error, described above.
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4. Defending the De Facto Unequal Treatment of Reckless Women
Perhaps the strongest objection to our statute pertains to its gender effects. While facially neutral
with regard to sex, as a practical matter women will be largely beyond prosecution. Men may not be able
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a woman consented to unprotected sex, but a woman
defendant will normally be able to prove that the man “gave unequivocal indications of affirmatively
consenting to engage in sexual activity that is specifically unprotected.” The man’s choice to place his
unsheathed penis inside the woman in most cases would provide an unequivocal indication. Thus, if we put
aside the truly aberrational case of a woman who puts a gun to the man’s head and coerces unprotected
125

sex, we should expect that women would rarely, if ever, be prosecuted under such a statute.

This de facto immunity initially seems unfair, because women can be reckless too in instigating,
precipitating or just willingly consenting to unprotected first-encounter sex. Why is it fair that the man who
consents to unprotected sex must run the risk of prosecution, when the woman who consents to
unprotected sex does not? Put differently, why should a male who engages unprotected sex bear the
burden of establishing an affirmative defense, when the very act of unprotected sex establishes the defense
for the reckless female?
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While this subsection speaks of de facto immunity for women, a more general characterization

would be to say that the statute would produce de facto immunity for a person who was penetrated. Thus,
with regard to first-encounter unprotected sex between two men, the man who was penetrated would be de
facto immune from prosecution, while the man who penetrated would not. We will return to specific
concerns raised by applying the statute to same-sex couples, infra page 66.
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One way to amend our model statute to remove this asymmetry would be to eliminate the
affirmative defense thereby transforming the crime into a strict liability offense – making both men and
women criminally liable for intentionally engaging in unprotected first encounter sex. Women would lose
their de facto absolute immunity, and men would lose the limited immunity offered by the affirmative defense.
To explain our preference for our proposed statute instead of the strict liability alternative, we must explain
both why we prefer a limited consent defense for men, and secondly, why we prefer a much broader de
facto immunity for women.
Our preference for a limited consent defense for men grows out of particular notion of culpability.
Even if unprotected first-encounter sex is socially reckless, it is reasonable to consider a male defendant to
be less culpable if his partner actively solicited his participation.126 Active solicitation or unequivocal
indications of consent are extenuating or mitigating factors that, as we will discuss below, track the contours
of traditional affirmative defenses. Just as entrapment can be an affirmative defense for defendants who are
egged on by government officials,127 the broad contours of our affirmative defense (with a purposeful degree
of drafting lenity due to difficulties of proof) afford immunity to male defendants who were likely to have
been encouraged (or seduced) to behave recklessly with regard to the spread of STDs.
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From the perspective of acquaintance rape, it is obviously relevant to a defendant’s culpability

whether or not the woman consented. But, as argued below, the affirmative defense only is constitutional if
it does not represent an essential element of the crime. Accordingly, we explicitly want to ground the
defense as a way of mitigating the culpability of acting recklessly with regard to the social risk of STDs.
127
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With regard to the de facto immunity for women, one must keep in mind that the law is not likely
asymmetric in practice. When a woman is reckless too, her male partner is more likely to be able to
establish the affirmative defense. So when the woman is reckless, both the man and the woman are likely to
be immune from prosecution. The real asymmetry would arise with regard to a woman who was in fact an
active and willing participant in the unprotected sex but who then falsely accused the man of forcing nonconsensual sex. This theoretical concern is again undermined by the social science research indicating that
few women make false claims.128
Moreover, our preference for a limited consent defense for men grows out of our twin concerns for
both acquaintance rape and STDs. The de facto gender asymmetry of the statute mirrors the de facto
gender asymmetry of acquaintance rape and the de facto gender-based injury asymmetry of STDs. The
vast majority of acquaintance rapists are male.129 From the perspective of making progress on acquaintance
rape it is almost completely unproblematic to have a larger de facto immunity for women. As discussed,
women are also much more likely to be infected with, and if infected, seriously injured by, STD
transmission. 130 This law protects those who are most likely to get hurt.
Most important, making women de facto immune preserves their freedom to come forward and
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report instances of reckless sex when they did not give unequivocal indications of consent. A strict liability
alternative to our statute would massively chill women’s incentives for reporting rape. Indeed, it is likely that
such a statute would aggravate the current under-reporting of acquaintance rape. A woman who was in fact
raped by an acquaintance in a first sexual encounter without a condom would have to worry that in reporting
the rape she would expose herself to potential prosecution for the crime of reckless sexual conduct. Strict
liability versions of the reckless sex statute – even those that nominally immunized rape victims from
prosecution – are intolerable because they are likely to exacerbate the under-reporting of acquaintance
rape.131 The last section rejected the possibility that the model statute might perversely lead to more
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Indeed, while we began this discussion by asking whether we should narrow the asymmetry in

immunity for men and women, the importance of preserving reporting incentives for victims of acquaintance
rape caused us to consider whether we should instead broaden the asymmetry by giving women a per se
defense against prosecution. We ultimately rejected this possibility. First, the explicit sexual discrimination
of such a statute would trigger heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, though this would not
necessarily kill the statute. A de jure immunity for the penetrated person in unprotected, first encounter sex
would likely be constitutional both because it does not expressly discriminate on the basis of sex and
because it furthers the important government interest of increasing the frequency of victim reporting, as
discussed above. (It also gives the immunity to the person much more likely to be infected.) Our deeper
concerns are prudential. We worry that social meaning of this de jure disparate treatment against men might
undermine the effectiveness of the statute. Because women can indeed be instigators of reckless sex, it is
unfair to expressly immunize them from any possibility of prosecution. The appearance of unfairness is
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acquaintance rape, but making both men and women strictly liable for engaging in unprotected, firstencounter sex might do just this.
Granting defendants an affirmative defense in these settings perversely increases the likelihood of
their conviction. There are likely to be more convictions of men under our model statute, then would occur
under an identical statute that removed the affirmative defense. In a world without the defense, women are
less likely to report non-consensual reckless sex. So even though the affirmative defense gives men more of
a chance of defending against an accusation, it on net exposes acquaintance rapists to a higher risk of
prosecution. Our statute might represent the rare instance in which granting defendants an affirmative
defense makes it easier for prosecutors to convict.

C. A Cognitive and Norms Analysis of the Statute
The rational actor analysis of the preceding section will be unpersuasive (and may even be offensive)
to certain readers who view evaluations of marginal carrots and sticks as poor predictors of human
behavior. We are particularly agnostic about the extent to which rationality and rational response to
incentives are a well-spring of human sexual behavior. The arrows of the prior section suggest the
theoretical directions of movements in sexuality, but not the size of the effects.
Ultimately, however, we believe that an even stronger case for the criminalization of reckless sexual
conduct can be made by taking into account both the cognitive biases that affect individuals and the ways
that social norms affect groups. The normative “consilience” of these three approaches – that rational actor,

important. And as discussed above, one can imagine pathological circumstances (gun-to-the-head
scenarios) in which a woman would in fact be prosecutable.
56

cognitive bias, and norms analysis all are shown to support the model statute – enhances our confidence in
the proposal. 132
This section will first suggest that taking into account the ways that individual decision making tends
to diverge from rationality strengthen the case for criminalization. We then suggest how a new crime of
reckless sexual conduct could play an important role in a broader campaign to strengthen the current norm
of using a condom in first sexual encounter.

1. Cognitive Departures from Rational Decision-Making
The increase of condom use in the shadow of the initial publicity about AIDS is good news for
rational actor theorists.133 It suggests that the rationality assumption can still aid in predicting behavior. The
fact that condom usage rose is a strong indication that behavior does respond to incentives. The idea that
people just will not stop “in the heat of the moment” is belied by the increased condom usage in response to
AIDS fears.
But the gains that were made in condom use during the AIDS scare now show signs of ebbing.134
As the threat of AIDS becomes more remote (or as the disease appears to be more treatable) in developed
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countries, people seem to be less likely to use a condom. 135 It may be that the scare did not last long
enough for people, particularly heterosexuals, to internalize the risk of contracting HIV.
More importantly, there is scant evidence that people have ever internalized the comprehensive risks
of unprotected sex. 136 Behavioral psychologists have identified a variety of cognitive biases that can cause
men to systematically underestimate the risks of unprotected sex. 137

The low salience of STDs and

acquaintance rate – especially with respect to first encounters -- may bias the risk downward. Availability
bias138 and optimism or self-serving bias139 can lead people to underappreciate the risks of both
acquaintance rape and STDs. The tendency of many men to treat acquaintance rape as something other
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than “real rape” may cause them to under-appreciate both its danger to the victim and the likelihood that
they would engage in it.140 Because successful prosecutions are so rare, many men may not have cognitively
available examples that could provide cues for their own action.
Prosecutions under the proposed law would increase the cognitive salience of acquaintance rape,
thus increasing the likelihood that men would fear it. Indeed, in an interesting way our law “economizes on
misogyny” to promote condom use. The kind of man who does not particularly care about the quality of a
woman’s consent may be the same kind of man who will find the risk of this new crime to be most salient.
This is because men who hold women in low esteem are likely to overestimate be risk of being falsely
accused. This “irrational” fear of false rape accusations is well established in the literature.141 The statute
harnesses this misogynous bias to offset the various other factors that make risk of STDs and nonconsensual sex low salience.
Lack of public awareness likely also leads to an under-appreciation of the risks of infecting another
with an STD. The STD victims of reckless sex are seldom publicized. Magic Johnson’s series of
unprotected dalliances might have caused the death of dozens of other people, but these causal connections
are rarely, if ever, discussed. Even when we hear about people who died from AIDS, the death is not
connected to the sexual source; nor is risky sexual behavior linked to the infection. The more people that
are prosecuted under the statute, the more cognitively available those causal connections will become.
Optimism and self-serving biases are also likely to contribute to individuals’ tendency to downplay

140

SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1988).

141

See, e.g., Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 81, at n. 81.

59

their likelihood of being infected. Importantly, the risk of infection stands in a very different place cognitively
than assessment of the risk of pregnancy (which might also be under-assessed because optimism and selfserving bias).142 One does not need to think badly about one’s choice of partner to worry that unprotected
sexual intercourse may lead to pregnancy. The same is not true about assessing the risk of STD infection.
To worry about being infected by one’s partner is to focus on that person’s sexual history and to worry
about how and why he or she has been infected. Particularly at the moment of deciding to engage in
intercourse, some people may want to reduce the salience of their partner’s prior sexual relationships. This
disassociation bias could lead to an irrationally low level of condom use.
Appreciating that men and women may underestimate the true risks of unprotected first encounters
strengthens the rationales for government intervention. Thus, our crime can be justified now not only by the
traditional “externalities” argument – men and women don’t take into account the harms to other people
when they engage in reckless sex. It can also be justified as a form of cognitive “paternalism” aimed at
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increasing the perceived risk of engaging in unprotected, first encounters.143 If the risk of acquaintance rape
and STD infection is currently low salience, then a new statute crime – which expressly defines and
criminalizes reckless sex – can increase the legal risk of engaging in unprotected first-encounter sex. This is
an example of “debiasing through law.”144

2. Reinforcing Existing Norms
Both the rational actor and cognitive analyses focused on the individual actor as the unit of analysis.
It is also useful to consider, at a more aggregate level, what impact a crime of reckless sex might have on the
social meaning of unprotected first encounter sex. This section argues that criminalization can play a useful
role in a larger strategy of reinforcing an emerging social norm to use condoms in first encounter sex.
a. The Message
To begin a discussion on changing social norms, it is important to emphasize that most people
already use condoms in first time encounters. According to a recent national study more than sixty percent
of adults report using condoms in casual relationships.145 For older readers who may be apt to extrapolate
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from their own historical experiences, this may come as a surprise.146 But in this age of AIDS (and herpes
and chlamydia), things have changed. The great majority of people report that they aspire to condom use in
casual sexual encounters.147
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Promoting condom use in first-time sexual encounters is thus not an attempt to instill a radically new
social norm. It is instead an attempt to reinforce a pre-existing norm and aspiration of most people in
society. Accordingly, the criminalization of reckless sex is not a “just say no” strategy. “Just say no”
campaigns run the risk of ambiguous signals. The listeners may think that they are being asked to play by
the rules when no one else is. Playing by the rules in such a situation if very unlikely to be seen as “cool.” 148
Society’s message to the sexually reckless is not “Just say no to unprotected sex;” rather it is “Just be like
everybody else!”149
The statute might also promote a new social norm by changing the social meaning attatched to using
a condom. As Cass Sunstein notes: “[S]ocial norms can also be an artifact of social meaning. Suppose that
the social meaning of condom use is a confession [or] an accusation. . . . If so, there will be a social norm
discouraging condom use.”150 In a separate article, Sunstein describes a New York Times article:
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in which some teenage boys said that they don't use condoms even though they really would like to
. . . and the reason is that use of a condom is an accusation or a confession, and neither is very
romantic. That is, the social meaning of condom use is to say, you probably have AIDS, or I might
have AIDS, and neither of those assumptions is very desirable to make in the relevant situation.151
Criminalizing unprotected first-encounter sex can give men an independent rationale for using a condom. In
the shadow of our statute, reaching for a condom would not imply that the man was infected or that he
worried about the woman’s being infected, it might merely be an attempt to comply with both the law and
the more general social norm to wear a condom while engaging in all first-encounter sex.
Because the average person has fewer than 10 sexual partners in a lifetime, the new law regulates a
small handful of events in the lives of most Americans. Because most Americans already use condoms in
first encounter sex, it is a law that asks most of us to change our behavior in fewer than 5 events in our lives.
The only people significantly affected by this law are those people whose current behavior is the most risky
– the small minority of citizens who are frequently engaging in unprotected first encounter sex.
Our statute is accordingly an example of what behavioral economists have recently termed
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“asymmetric” interventions.152 The idea here is that, when possible, government should prefer interventions
that tend to constrain the behavior of the most cognitively biased individuals, while leaving relatively
unaffected those people whose choices are relatively unbiased.153 The statute is structured to do just this. It
asks the most of the right-hand tale of population – people who have dozens or hundreds of sexual partners
– but asks little if anything of the majority of people who already use condoms for initial sexual encounters.
All encompassing campaigns for “safe sex” or “100% condom use” are, if taken literally,
unreasonable. If all couples used condoms all the time, the human race would cease to exist.154 There is no
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valid policy reason for making monogamous long-term sexual partners use condoms. Programs advocating
100% condom use for sex workers, on the other hand, are quite laudable,155 but insufficient. Condom
advocates have yet to offer precise advice as to where to draw the line between these two poles. We
draw the line at first encounter sex.156 While this standard for condom usage is under-inclusive of optimal
“safe sex” practices, criminal statutes are often structured to target the most egregious anti-social behavior.

Another possibility would be to require that condoms be used 100% of the time when partners are
not married, but not necessarily at all if the partners are married. If universally accepted this rule would likely

thus within some number of generations under this pathological hypothetical become an endangered species.
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end STD epidemics.157 Thus, a bright line marriage rule could be an effective public health measure, but it
would seriously infringe on the sexual expression rights of unmarried people. Same-sex couples in many
states would never have the option of non-condom use and neither would faithful unmarried straight couples.
Faithful couples who begin a relationship without infection should, regardless of their marital status, retain
the ability to engage in unprotected sex – even for non-procreative purposes – if they so desire.158 Our
model statute aims at reinforcing a much less demanding (and therefore more sustainable) norm. Unlike the
impracticable demands of 100% condom use no matter what, or 100% condom use for all non-marital sex,
the statute requires 100% condom use for all first-encounter sex. 159
b. The Punishment
We have intentionally drafted the model statute to have a mild sanction – of only three months. We
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have done this because if the criminal sanction is too strong, there is not likely to be widespread
enforcement. Widespread enforcement will be critical to the statute’s efficacy. As Dan Kahan has argued,
attempts to change a norm by severely punishing that which has previously been unaddressed or underenforced are often unsuccessful.160 One reason for this is that decision-makers enforcing the laws (police
officers, prosecutors, judges) often balk at imposing strict penalties for offenses that many people do not
view as extremely offensive. Unprotected sex would almost certainly fall into this category. Prosecutors
and jurors will not work to seriously condemn someone whose only proven offense is not wearing a
condom in a first time sexual encounter. In all probability, those decision makers do not view the behavior
as all that bad.
Those same decision makers might be willing to punish the behavior a little though, particularly as
they learn more about the dangers associated with the behavior. The more the behavior gets punished
somewhat, the easier it will become to punish in general and the more people will be punished. The more
people are punished, the more certain punishment will be, the more people will become aware of the
dangers and the less likely people will be to engage in the behavior.161 The less people engage in the
behavior, the easier it will be to ratchet up the punishment in order to proportionally reflect the degree of
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harm involved.162
Increased punishment should also help change the norm of indifference with regard to whether one’s
partner is consenting to sex. Changing this norm should lead to much more effective prosecution of
acquaintance rape. The crime of reckless sexual conduct creates a category of sexual offense that is not
rape or sexual assault, but is still criminal. Reckless sexual conduct should not be presented as a substitute
for rape. It is not to be prosecuted, punished or perceived as such. It is instead a crime that tries to control
behavior that can lead to rape, just as drunk driving laws try to control behavior that can lead to
manslaughter. If most people do not conflate a DUI conviction with a manslaughter conviction, people need
not conflate a conviction for reckless sex with a rape conviction.
The recent history of rape enforcement shows all too clearly how resistant juries and prosecutors
are to punishing offenders who have not raped in the traditional sense.163 There are embedded images of
who a rapist is164 and who a rapist is not.165 When the alleged rapist and the facts of the crime alleged fail to
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conform to the embedded cultural definition of rape, the crimes do not get prosecuted, or if prosecuted, do
not result in convictions.166

The simple fact is that the public at large often refuses to see the “non-

traditional” rapist as a rapist at all and therefore refuses to either mark him or punish him as such. After an
acquittal in a well-publicized college gang rape, one juror explained that the jury’s “main concern . . . [was
not] want[ing] to ruin the boys’ lives.”167 Decision makers may be willing to ruin the life of a “real rapist,”
but they will not impose comparable punishment for what they see as a less severe crime. The crime of
reckless sexual conduct will make it easier to punish callous sexual behavior precisely because the
punishment will not ruin the defendants’ lives.
Many reformers have worked very hard to get jurors, judges, police and prosecutors to see that
women acquaintances can be sexually assaulted in ways that are equally as devastating as stranger rape, if
not more so.168 This work is important and their claims are valid, but the attempt to illuminate the realness of
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some acquaintance rape has obscured the moral wrong of other behavior that may not constitute or could
never be proved to be rape.169 In emphasizing that acquaintance rapists are “real rapists,” the movement has
had the effect of erasing the moral category of reckless sexual conduct. Under their approach, a man is
either a “rapist” or legally not culpable. Our statute imposes a less severe punishment precisely because
what we are attacking directly is recklessness, not the result of recklessness.
We also intentionally choose to exempt convicted defendants from registering on a state’s list of
sexual offenders. Jurors deciding these cases should not be determining whether the defendant is rapist or
the kind of serious sexual offender whose whereabouts need to be tracked on an ongoing basis. Indeed, a
signal that our statute was working would be if the public developed a pejorative noun, other than “rapist,”
to refer to a person who engaged in culpably reckless sexual behavior – something akin to a “drunk
driver.”170
c. The Program
Ideally, the new crime of reckless sexual conduct should be a part of larger private and public effort
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to eliminate unprotected first-encounter sex. While some may view social norms as beyond the reach of
policy engineering, we are heartened by the dramatic impact of Mothers Against Drunk Drivers (MADD).
MADD became a political force in the early 80s.171 In just a few years, MADD had successfully lobbied in
state after state for tougher drunk driving laws. In 1984, Congress responded by requiring all states to raise
the drinking age to 21 as a condition of receiving highway money.172 MADD, as a grassroots organization,
realized that its power came from public awareness. It was MADD that popularized the concept of
“designated drivers” and the first red ribbon campaign (asking people to “tie one on” for safe driving).173
MADD’s slogan is "the Voice of the Victim," but they succeed in large part because they dramatically put a
face on the victims of recidivist drunk drivers.174
Inspired by MADD’s example, it would be useful for public and private groups to put a face on the
victims of reckless sex. There already is a Mothers Against Sexual Abuse,175 but it would be useful to
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develop a group that showed the STD victims of reckless sex. The idea is to show the people who are
injured by reckless sex and the people who did the injuring. Who killed Rock Hudson? And who did
Rock Hudson kill? This effort would be part of a larger campaign to valorize protected, first-encounter
sex.176
We would see the passage of the reckless sex statute as part of an incremental process of
reinforcing norms of condoms and communication for first sexual encounters. Starting with more lenient
punishment will make it easier to generate more convictions. More convictions will make the risk of
unprotected, first-encounter sex more salient. Once the current norm starts to shift even more strongly
toward condom use so that it is truly abnormal to not take the time to put on a condom, it will become
easier to punish, and punish more severely those transgressors. Just as with drunk driving laws, it may well
become possible to have stronger second-generation punishments.177 “We just got carried away”178 will not
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be a defense to the crime of reckless sexual conduct. Once people accept the illegitimacy of that defense
for a crime of recklessness, it will become increasingly illegitimate as a defense to rape as well.

IV. Responding to Constitutional Objections
The last section showed from a triumvirate of perspectives why criminalizing reckless sex is likely to
make progress on the social problems of both STDs and acquaintance rape. There remains, however, the
issue of whether our proposed statute is constitutional. In this section, we take on questions of whether our
affirmative defense violates the Due Process Clause and whether the statute’s more general regulation of
sexuality unconstitutionally burdens the rights of privacy and freedom of association.

A. Constitutionality of Affirmative Defense
The affirmative defense afforded defendants is amply supported as a matter of public policy. First,
as discussed above, this defense gives women who are the victims of non-consensual sex more freedom to
come forward and report the crime to police.179 Second, the difficulty of proving non-consent beyond a
reasonable doubt makes the re-allocation of the burden more appropriate.180 Indeed, the state of

conviction because there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she did not
consent.
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Washington already allocates the burden of presenting and proving the issue of consent to the defendant in
(far more serious) rape cases.181 Third, putting the burden of proving non-consent on the prosecution in
cases involving unprotected first encounter sex would encode in the law a presumption that women willingly
put their physical and emotional health at extreme risk. It would assume that women act recklessly unless
the prosecution can prove otherwise. It makes far more sense to assume that no one acts recklessly, unless
the prosecution can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that unprotected sex happened. At that point,
instead of assuming that the person most likely to be hurt by the reckless behavior was reckless, the law
should require the person with the least to lose182 and the most to gain183 from the reckless behavior to show

diligence to defendant corporations, instead of forcing the prosecution to prove the lack of due diligence
beyond a reasonable doubt. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(5) (1985).
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that his partner willingly consented to the risk.
Regardless of the policy arguments in favor of an affirmative defense, however, it is important to
separately address whether the defense accords with the demands of the Constitution. The Due Process
Clause demands that a prosecution prove “beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged.”184
As many scholars have recognized, this constitutional command is ripe for legislative manipulation.
Because the prosecution must only prove beyond a reasonable doubt those facts that are “necessary to
constitute a crime,” legislatures can reallocate any element of a crime as an affirmative defense so long as it
engages in “arid formalism.”185 Statutes can come to define smaller and smaller subsets of elements as being
necessary for conviction. In Patterson v. New York,186 the Court recognized this problem, commenting
that the Constitution “may seem to permit state legislatures to reallocate burdens of proof by labeling as
affirmative defenses at least some elements of the crime now defined in their statutes.”187 In famous dicta,
the Court responded: “there are obviously constitutional limits beyond which the States may not go in this
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regard.”188
The question for us is whether the proposed statute can shift the burden of proving consent to the
defendant and still stay within those constitutional limits. We think there little doubt that it can, for one
simple reason: Our statute does not criminalize what rape statutes criminalize. Our statute criminalizes
unprotected sex. Rape statutes criminalize nonconsensual sex. We have not found one rape statute that
even mentions unprotected sex. The crime of reckless sexual conduct therefore could not be a lesser
included offense to the crime of rape. It would be perfectly possible to be guilty of rape, but not guilty
under our statute. Our statute also imposes a significantly less severe punishment than does rape – and for
a good reason: the crime of reckless sexual assault is not about punishing nonconsensual sex, it is about
punishing the less egregious acts involved in first time unprotected sex.
As we noted previously, a strict liability offense, which would remove consent from the analysis
completely, could readily be justified as necessary for public health reasons. If the analysis of Part I is
correct, merely inducing condom use in first sexual encounters can effectively destroy the transmission
networks of many STDs and consequently put an end to epidemics. Independent of any concern with
consent, there is a strong policy rationale for criminalizing all first encounter sex that is unprotected.
From this perspective, the affirmative defense is nothing like an essential element of the crime. It is
instead merely a factor that mitigates or extenuates the defendant’s culpability. While a man who
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participates in unprotected first-encounter sex is criminally reckless, he is less culpable if his partner actively
solicited the unprotected sex. 189 Thus, our affirmative defense parallels the affirmative defenses of
entrapment, and irresistible impulse – defenses that qualify society’s condemnation of the defendant’s state
of mind.
We have included a defense of consent both because, somewhat counterintuitively, it makes it more
likely that acquaintance rape will be prosecuted, and because consent qualifies the perceived egregiousness
of the defendant’s behavior. A consent defense also encourages conversation and protects the sexual
freedom of those couples who want to engage in unprotected sex. By encouraging communication our
statute guards against acquaintance rape, but nonconsensual sex is not the target of our statute.190
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(between two people who knew they were not STD carriers) our statute imposes an unnecessary health
regulation. It is only for this small group of cases that the statute might be seen as regulating the same thing
as rape statutes because the only reason to require such couples to use protection is to protect against
nonconsensual sex. This class of cases is so minute and the cost of compliance is so small (get consent or
use a condom) that we think it extraordinarily unlikely that it could be seen to violate Constitutional
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B. Burdening Privacy and Association Freedom
Finally, we assess whether the statute unduly burdens the constitutional rights of privacy and
associational freedom. We do not contest that our statute regulates sexual expression in novel ways.
Indeed, where once the state used criminal statutes to impede the distribution of birth-control,191 we are now
using criminal law to mandate it. However, our restrictions do not infringe on the constitutional rights of
sexual expression as they have emerged to date.
First, it is important to keep in mind that sexual expression, like all forms of expression, can be
subject to reasonable time, place and manner restrictions. Our statute regulates the manner in which people
are able to participate in a first time sexual encounter. All we require is that the couple actually discuss (or
otherwise communicate about) the issue of protection so that they can be clear that if the expression is to be
unprotected, both parties agree to it. There are virtually no long term consequences that flow from this
restriction and it is hard to see how this could be considered unreasonable in any circumstances.192
Second, it bears repeating that this is a one-time-per relationship health regulation. It does not
impose any kind of regulation on an on-going intimate relationship. We readily accept that sexual
relations can be an important means of enriching and nurturing a relationship. The Supreme Court has
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now endorsed this view unequivocally, but when it has protected sexual expression, the Supreme Court
has done so as a way of protecting and fostering the relationship in which it is being expressed, rather
than the expression itself.193 The parties’ relationship is not unduly burdened when the parties are free
either to agree to unprotected sex or to engage in unprotected sex after just one encounter. The sexual
liberties that are constitutionally protected from state interference,194 “the realm of personal liberty which
the government may not enter,”195 are simply not implicated by a statute that only affects first time sexual
encounters.
Third, the behavior regulated here can cause significant harm, in part despite and in part because of
its intimate nature. In striking down the Texas sodomy statute in Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Kennedy was
careful to point out that a general sodomy statute does not target “persons who might be injured or coerced
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or who are situated in relationships where consent might not be easily refused.”196 First time unprotected
sexual encounters involve precisely all of those dangers. The proposed statute is a minimally intrusive
means of guarding against those dangers.
Nonetheless, there may be certain populations that are particularly affected by this regulation.
Those who routinely engage in casual sexual encounters, and particularly those who embrace the importance
of casual sexual encounters to their sexual identity, will be more burdened than others by this regulation.
We recognize that portions of the gay male population are likely to be disproportionately burdened. In a
recent survey of sexual behavior in a well-known gay Chicago neighborhood, researchers found fourtythree percent of men saying that they had had more than 60 sexual partners. Another eighteen percent had
between 31 and 60 partners and another twenty-seven percent had between 16 and 30 partners.197 This
means that eighty-three percent of this urban gay male population has well over the average number of
lifetime sexual partners.198 Obviously these men will have more than the average number of first time
encounters. Moreover, the same researchers noted that most “men-seeking-men” personal advertisements
in the neighborhood “identify casual sex rather than long-term relationships as their goal.” This means that
the proposed statute will necessarily restrict the lives of gay men much more than the norm both because
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gay men tend to have more sexual partners than is the norm and because gay men tend to prefer casual
encounters more than is the norm. Moreover, this preference for casual sex may well be a preference that
gays classify as an important part of their sexual identity.199
As discussed, and notwithstanding the advent of queer theory, it is unlikely that one could read even
the most expansive Supreme Court case on sexual expression200 as protecting the importance of casual
sexual encounters to one’s sexual identity. Certain groups valuing a practice does not give that practice
constitutional protection. More important, our statute does not regulate casual sex, per se. We remain
agnostic on the question of whether casual sex is good and an important part of some people’s sexual
identity. We do not remain agnostic on whether unprotected casual sex is good. Unprotected firstencounter casual sex is incredibly dangerous, not only for the participants but for anyone who will come into
unprotected sexual contact with those participants.201 Neither privacy nor associational rights will be
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“unduly burdened” by its reasonable regulation.202

Conclusion
Let us return to the Introduction’s discussion of Star. If prosecuted for rape, Star may well be
acquitted. If not prosecuted at all, perhaps because the alleged victim’s sexual history renders her such a
problematic witness, both Star and the alleged victim go home and the world will be left to believe that what
happened in that resort was “just” a one night stand. So it may have been, but even if it was “only that,” it
was a reckless, dangerous encounter and it was abnormal. Most people now use condoms for one-night
stands. Those who do not use condoms run the risk of seriously endangering their partners, both physically
and emotionally.
Currently, the law’s regulation of reckless sexual conduct is sporadic at best. While there is some
prosecution of people who recklessly infect others with HIV, there is almost no regulation of the reckless
infliction of other STDs and, save rape, there is no regulation of the reckless infliction of the emotional harm
that can flow from careless sexual behavior.

Comparably, while there is some indirect legal

acknowledgement that condoms or the lack thereof may speak to the issue of consent and while there is de
facto recognition that first time sexual encounters are more easily regulated than subsequent sexual
encounters, the law has yet to regulate unprotected first time sexual encounters in any kind of
comprehensive way. This deficiency in the law exists despite the fact that unprotected first time sexual
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encounters are likely the locus of the lion’s share of both STD transmission and acquaintance rape.
Our statute fills that gaping hole. Giving men a new incentive to wear a condom in first-time sexual
encounters should significantly reduce both the risk of sexually transmitted infections and the tragic lack of
communication that often gives rise to the illusion of consent. Because so many first-time encounters are not
followed by subsequent encounters and because just a few people with many unprotected encounters can
be so powerful in spreading STDs, a law that requires protection in first time encounters will be very
effective at reducing the spread of STDs. Because so many acquaintance rapes are first-time encounters
and because so many of those rapes are primarily caused by a lack of communication, a law that fosters
communication in first time encounters will likely be very effective at reducing the incidence of acquaintance
rape. Our proposal is such a law.
We have argued that three different analytical approaches, rational actor, cognitive bias and norms
analysis, support our claim that the proposed statute should reduce the risk of both STD transmission and
acquaintance rape. This “consilience” should give public health specialists and rape reformers added
confidence in the statute.
We are all hurt by a world in which sex is reduced to a base, non-communicative physical act. We
are all hurt by a world in which the number of people infected with STDs reaches epidemic proportions.
People on the right and left side of the political spectrum can agree that unprotected casual sex does little
good for anyone and has the potential to do much harm. A crime of reckless sex, by encouraging people to
protect themselves and their sexual partners, can encourage deliberation and communication in ways that
promote public health and greatly reduce unnecessary and damaging sexual violence.
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